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The Meno tells us that knowledge is true belief bound by an aitias logismos, an 
explanatory account (98a); the Phaedo tells us that all aitiai refer to Forms 
(96 ff.). It follows that knowledge of Forms is necessary for any knowledge at 
all. But although the Meno explains what knowledge is, it does not connect 
this account to Forms; and although the Phaedo tells us quite a lot about the 
metaphysics of Forms, it does not tell us much about their epistemologica! 
role. We must wait until the middle books of the Republic (V-VII) for the 
details of how Forms figure in knowledge. Here there are two crucial 
stretches of text: first, a difficult argument at the end of Republic v; and, 
second, the famous images of the Sun, Line and Cave in Books vi and vn. 
Both passages are often thought to show that Plato subscribes to the Two 
Worlds Theory (TW), according to which there is no knowledge of sensibles, 
but only of Forms,1 and no belief about Forms but only about sensibles.2 
If Plato is committed to TW, there are, arguably, some consequences of 
note. First, the objects of knowledge and belief are then disjoint; one cannot 
move from belief to knowledge about some single thing. I cannot first believe 
that the sun is shining, and then come to know that it is. Second, Plato then 
radically rejects the Meno's account of knowledge, according to which true 
beliefs become knowledge when they are adequately bound to an explana-
1 A detailed account of what Forms are is not possible here. But, briefly, I taJte 
Forms to be non-sensibie properties, properties not definable in observational or 
perceptual terms - the property, e.g.. of beauty, as opposed both to particular 
beautiful objects (such as the Parthenon) and to observable properties of beauty 
(such as circular shape or bright colour). For some discussion, see my [115] 
and [116]. 
2 It is sometimes thought to follow from TW that Plato restricts knowledge to 
necessary truths; for, it is thought, all truths about Forms are necessary truths. 
See, e.g., Vlastos [86J. 16. If, as I shall argue, Plato allows knowledge of 
sensibles, then (on the reasonable assumption that some of the knowable truths 
about them are contingent) he does not restrict knowledge to necessary truths. 
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tory account. For the Meno, knowledge implies true belief; on TW, knowl­
edge excludes true belief.3 
Third, Plato is then quite sceptical about the limits of knowledge: 
although at least philosophers can know Forms, no one can know items in 
the sensible world. No one can know, for example, what actions are just or 
good: no one can know even such mundane facts as that they're now seeing 
a tomato, or sitting at a table. 
Fourth, this sceptical result would be quite surprising in the context of the 
Republic, which aims to persuade us that philosophers should rule, since 
only they have knowledge, and knowledge is necessary for good ruling. If 
their knowledge is only of Forms - if, like the rest of us, they only have belief 
about the sensible world - it is unclear why they are specially fitted to rule in 
this world. They don't know, any more than the rest of us do, which laws to 
enact. 
Fifth, the text of the Republic seems to contradict TW. At 506c, Plato says 
that he has beliefs about, but no knowledge of, the Form of the good; and at 
520c he says that the philosopher who returns to the cave will know the 
things there, i.e. sensibles.* Contrary to TW. then, one can have beliefs about 
Forms, and know sensibles. 
I shall argue that we can avoid these unattractive consequences. For 
Republic v-vii is not committed to TW. (If I had more space, I would argue 
that Plato is never committed to TW: the Republic is no anomaly.) 
Plato does, to be sure, in some way correlate knowledge with Forms, and 
belief with sensibles - but not in a way that involves TW. He argues only that 
all knowledge requires (not that it Is restricted to) knowledge of Forms; and 
that, restricted to sensibles, one can at most achieve belief. This, however, 
leaves open the possibility that, once one knows Forms, one can apply this 
knowledge to sensibles so as to know them too: the philosopher's knowledge 
of Forms, for instance, helps him to know (although it is not, all by itself, 
sufficient for knowing) which laws ought to be enacted. 
In addition to arguing against TW, I shall also, in looking at Republic vi-
vn, argue that Plato is a coherentist, rather than a foundationalist, about 
justification. That is, he believes that all beliefs, to be known, must be 
justified in terms of other beliefs: no beliefs are self-evident or self-justified. I 
shall also suggest that knowledge, for Plato, is always essentially articulate; 
3 This consequence of TW Is clearly noted by Armstrong [394], 137f. Unlike me. 
however, he believes the Republic endorses TW. 
4 Plato says that the philosopher 'will know each of the Images, what they are 
and of what': his use of gnOsesthe plus the hatta clause suggests he means 
'know' and not merely 'recognise'. Plato arguably explicitly admits knowledge 
of sensibles elsewhere too. See, e.g., Meno 71b; 97a9-b7; Theaetetus 201 a-c. 
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knowledge does not consist in any special sort of vision or acquaintance, but 
in one's ability to explain what one knows. 
Republic v' 
The difficult argument at the end of Republic ν is Plato's lengthiest, 
most sustained, systematic account in the middle dialogues of how knowl­
edge differs from belief. It is offered in defence of the 'greatest wave of 
paradox' of the Republic: that, in the ideally just polis, philosophers - those 
who know Forms - must rule (472al-7, 473c6-e5). Plato advances this 
striking claim because he believes that the best rulers must know what is 
good; but one can know what is good only if one knows the Form of the good; 
and only philosophers can achieve such knowledge. He is well aware that 
his claim will not meet with general favour. In order to defend it, he offers a 
long and tangled argument, designed gently to persuade the 'sightlovers' -
people who rely on their senses and do not acknowledge Forms. 
This provides us with an important constraint governing an adequate 
interpretation of the argument. The argument occurs in a particular dialec­
tical context, designed to persuade the sightlovers. If it is to be genuinely 
dialectical, then, as Plato explains in the Meno (75d), it should only use 
claims that are (believed to be) true, and that the interlocutor accepts; this is 
Plato's dialectical requirement (DR). Plato's opening premises should not, 
then, appeal to Forms; nor, indeed, should he begin with any claims the 
sightlovers would readily dispute, or that they're unfamiliar with. His 
conclusions may of course be controversial, but the opening premises 
should not be. 
The opening premises, however, are difficult to interpret. The crucial ones 
are these6: 
(1) Knowledge is set over what is (epi tö(i) onti) (477a9-10). 
(2) Belief is set over what is and is not. 
Esii (like 'is' in English) can be used in a variety of ways: exist-
entially (is-e), predicatively (is-p), and veridically (is-v). (It can be used in yet 
further ways too - for example, for identity - but such further uses are not 
relevant here.) Hence (1) might mean any of (la-c): 
(la) Knowledge is set over what exists. 
(lb) Knowledge is set over what is F (for some predicate 'F' to be 
determined by context). 
(lc) Knowledge is set over what is true. 
5 I discuss this argument in more detail in [145]. Here I offer a brief summary of 
tile main points. The present account occasionally differs from, and so 
supersedes, my earlier account. 
6 Plato also discusses agnoia, ignorance, correlating it with what is not (477a9-
10). For some discussion, see my [145]. 
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Premise (2), correspondingly, might mean any of (2a-c): 
(2a) Belief is set over what exists and does not exist. 
(2b) Belief is set over what is F and not-F. 
(2c) Belief is set over what is true and not true. 
On the (a) and (b) readings, ( 1 ) and (2 ) specify the objects of knowledge and 
belief. On the (a) reading, one can only know what exists (there is no 
knowledge of, for instance, Santa Claus); and one can only have beliefs 
about objects that exist and don't exist (that is, on the usual interpretation, 
about objects that somehow 'half-exist').7 
On the (b) reading, (1) claims that one can only know objects that are F; 
and (2) claims that one can only have beliefs about objects that are F and 
not-F. (That is, on the usual interpretation, every object of belief is itself both 
F and not-F - both beautiful and ugly, e.g., or just and unjust.)" 
On the (c) reading, by contrast, (1) and (2) specify the propositions that 
are the contents of knowledge and belief. One can only know true proposi­
tions; one can believe both true and false propositions. Knowledge, but not 
belief, entails truth. 
The (a)'and (b) readings of ( 1 ) and (2) seem to violate DR. For both of them 
sharply separate the objects of knowledge and belief. But why should the. 
sightlovers agree to this at the outset of the argument? Plato may end up 
concluding that the objects of knowledge and belief are disjoint; but it would 
violate DR to assume so at the outset. 
7 (la) can be interpreted in more than one way. It might mean that (i) I can only 
know χ when χ exists; or (ii) I can only know χ if χ at some point exists; or (iii) 
1 can only know χ if * always exists. My own view is that of (i-iii). Plato at 
most believes (ii); but whatever his beliefs about (la), I do not think he intends 
to assert any version of (la) at this stage of the argument. (2a) is ambiguous 
between (i) Every object of belief both exists and doesn't exist, i.e., half-exists: 
and (ii) The set of objects about which one can have beliefs includes some that 
exist and others that don't (e.g. Santa Claus) (and perhaps some that both exist 
and don't exist, or that half-exist). Since (I) Is the usual ls-e reading, I restrict 
myself to it. For a defence of an is-e reading, see, e.g.. Cross and Woozley [140]. 
For criticism of an is-e reading, see my [145]; Vlastos [152]; Annas [139], 196-
7: Kahn [151]. 
8 (2b) is ambiguous between (i) belief is about objects, each of which is F and 
not-F; and (ii) belief is about objects, some of which are F and others of which 
are not-F (and perhaps some of which are both). Since (i) is the usual 
interpretation, I shall not try to see how the argument goes if we assume (ii) 
instead. A predicative reading is favoured by Vlastos [152]: and by Annas 
[139], ch. 8. Annas correctly points out that even if Plato restricts knowledge to 
what is F, and precludes knowledge of anything that Is F and not-F, TW does 
not follow; we could still know, e.g.. that this is a table, or that Socrates is a 
man, even if we could not know that returning what one owes is sometimes 
just, sometimes unjust. (Vlastos, by contrast, conjoins ls-p with a defence of 
TW.) On the account I shall provide we can know things that are F and not-F. 
Knowledge and belief in Republic v-vu 89 
The (a) reading violates DR in further ways too. To be sure, if, for example, 
one takes knowledge to involve some sort of acquaintance, (la) might seem 
plausible: I cannot know, in the-sense of be acquainted with, Santa Claus, or 
even with Socrates, given that he is now dead. But it is unclear why we 
should assume at the outset that knowledge consists in or requires acquaint­
ance with what is known. Moreover, (2b) introduces the difficult notion of 
'half-existence'. But why should the sightlovers agree at the outset that 
every object of belief only half-exists? 
The (b) reading also violates DR in ways peculiar to it. For it claims that 
one can only know what is F; one cannot know what is F and not-F. But it is 
unclear how this could be a non-controversial starting premise. Why can I 
not know that this pencil, say, is both equal (to other things of the same. 
length) and unequal (to everything of any different length)? There seems no 
intuitive reason to suppose that Plato begins by denying the possibility of 
knowing that something is both F and not-F. Of course, he may end up 
concluding this (although I shall argue that in fact he does not); but bur 
present task is to find suitably non-controversial starting premises. 
Premise (lc), by contrast, satisfies DR. For it says only that knowledge 
entails truth, a standard condition on knowledge the sightlovers can be 
expected to accept, and one Plato himself has clearly articulated before 
(Meno 98a; Gorg. 454d6-7). 
There are, however, at least two possible veridical readings of (2c):' 
(2ci) Every proposition that can be believed is both true and false. 
(2cii) The set of propositions that can be believed includes some truths 
and some falsehoods. 
Premise (2ci) is controversial, since it introduces the difficult notion of a 
single proposition's being both true and false. We might be able to make 
sense of this notion: perhaps, for example, the claim is that all believed 
propositions are complex, and part of what each says is true, part false. But 
why should the sightlovers agree that all beliefs are partly true, partly false? 
If we can find a more intuitively acceptable reading of the opening premises, 
it should be preferred.10 
Premise (2cii) is such a reading. In contrast to (2ci), it does not say that 
each token proposition that can be believed is both true and false, but only 
9 (2cl) is endorsed by Cosling. in [147]. I endorse (2cli) in [145] and here. 
10 Notice, though, that (2c!) does not support TW: for there is no reason In 
principle why I cannot believe a proposition that is both true and false 
(however we ultimately explain that notion) about a Form, or know a true 
proposition about sensibles. On (2ci), the propositions one can believe and the 
propositions one can know constitute disjoint classes; but they could be about 
the same objects, and so TW would not yet be In the offing. 
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that the set of propositions that can be believed contains both true and false 
beliefs. Belief entails neither truth nor falsity; there are both true and false 
beliefs. We cannot infer from the fact that ρ is believed that ρ is true, or that It 
is false, although we can infer from the fact that ρ is known that ρ Is true. 
If we read (1) as (lc), and (2) as (2cli), then all we have been told so far is 
that knowledge but not belief is truth-entailing. This of course leaves open 
the possibility (although it does not require) that there is knowledge and 
belief about the same objects (including sensibles), indeed of the same 
propositions. The readings of the opening premises that best satisfy DR are 
thus also the least congenial to TW. Of course, later premises might tell in 
favour of TW; we shall need to see. The point for now is only that at least ( 1-
2) (if read as (lc) and as (2cii)) do not at all suggest it. 
From 477b-478b. Plato argues that knowledge and belief are different 
capacities. First he argues that capacities are distinguished by (a) what they 
are set over (epi) and by (b) what work they do (477c6-d5). Two capacities 
are the same, if they satisfy both (a) and (b); they differ if they are set over 
different things and do different work. Plato then seems to argue that since 
knowledge and belief satisfy (b) differently, they are different capacities; and 
that since they are different capacities, they satisfy (a) differently as well. 
The first Inference seems warranted; even if χ and y satisfy only one of (a) 
and (b) differently, they seem to be different capacities. But the second 
inference does not seem warranted; why can't knowledge and belief do 
different work (and so be different capacities) even if they are set over the 
same things? Husbandry and butchery, for instance, do different work; but 
they are both set over the same objects - domestic animals. 
If we favour the objects analysis, so that knowledge and belief are set over 
different objects, then Plato does seem to argue invalidly here. Just as the 
objects analysis seems to require Plato to violate DR. so it seems to require 
him to argue invalidly. If, however, we favour the contents analysis, so that 
knowledge and belief are not set over different objects but only over different 
contents, then not only are Plato's starting premises non-controversial, but 
also, as I shall now argue, the present argument about capacity individu­
ation is valid. 
Knowledge and belief do different work. Plato tells us. in that knowledge 
but not belief is infallible (anhamarteton, 477e6-7). This might only mean 
that knowledge but not belief entails truth: that's one way (the only correct 
way) to read the slogan 'If you know, you can't be wrong'; and it's the only 
reading of the slogan that the argument requires." 
But how can we legitimately infer from this difference of work to a 
11 For quite a different interpretation of 'infallibility', see Vlastos [86], 12-13. 
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difference in what knowledge and belief are set over? My reading of (1) and 
(2) provides the answer: knowledge is set over true propositions; belief is set 
over true and false propositions. It follows from the fact that knowledge but 
not belief is truth-entailing, that they are set over different (though not 
necessarily disjoint) sets of propositions — the set of propositions one can 
know (true propositions) is a subset of (and so is different from) the set of 
propositions one can believe (true and false propositions). 
Plato's inference from (b) to (a) is thus warranted after all - if we assume 
that knowledge and belief are set over different sets of propositions, rather 
than over different objects. Moreover, if we read the argument this way, then 
Plato leaves open the possibility (although, again, he does not require) that 
one can know and have beliefs about the same objects, and even of the same 
propositions. A valid, suitably non-controversial argument goes hand in 
hand with avoiding TW. 
To be sure, Plato claims that what is known (gnòston) and what is believed 
(doxaston) cannot be the same (478al2-b2). This, however, might only 
mean that the set of propositions one can believe is not co-extensivé with the -
set of propositions one can know - for one can believe but not know false 
propositions. Moire weakly still. Plato might only mean that the properties of 
being known and of being believed are different properties. Either claim is 
plausible, and all that the argument, at this stage, requires. 
All of the argument to 478e can be read as emphasising this crucial point, 
that knowledge but not belief entails truth. At 479a ff., however, Plato shifts 
to another point: 
(3) Each of the many Fs is both F and not-F. 
The many Fs are sensible properties, of the sort recognised by the 
sightlover - bright colour, for instance, or circular shape.12 (3) claims that 
each such property is both F and not-F. Bright colour, for example. Is both 
beautiful and ugly in that some brightly coloured things are beautiful, others 
ugly; returning what one owes is both just and unjust in that some token 
actions of returning what one owes are just, others unjust. Any sensible 
property adduced to explain what it is to be F (at least, for a certain range of 
predicates) will be both F and not-F, in that it will have some F, and some 
not-F, tokens. Here, in contrast to (1) and (2), 'is' is used predicatively, for 'is 
F' rather than for 'is true'. One might think that therefore ( 1 ) and (2) also use 
'is' predicatively; or that Plato is confused about the differences between the 
predicative and veridical 'is'. But neither hypothesis is necessary. Plato shifts 
from a veridical to a predicative use of'is'; but he does so without confusion. 
There is instead a connecting link between the two uses, as we shall see. 
12 For a defence of this claim, see, e.g., Gosling [146]. 
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Plato expects the sightlovers to accept (3); he is still speaking in terms 
acceptable to them. Indeed, it is because they accept (3) that they deny that 
'Beauty is one' (479a4). They deny, that is, that beauty is a single property, 
the same in all cases; there are, rather, many beautifuls - many different 
properties, each of which is the beautiful. In this painting, the beautiful is 
bright colour; in that one, it is sombre colour, and so on. 
Plato, however, accepts the One over Many assumption: there is just one 
property, the F, the same in all cases, in virtue of which all and only F things 
are F. If we build this assumption into the argument, then we can see how 
Plato finally denies the sightlovers knowledge, and argues that all knowl­
edge requires knowledge of Forms.13 
The next steps in the argument are: 
(4) The sightlovers' beliefs (nomima) about the many Fs are and are not 
(479d3-5). 
(5) Therefore, the sightlovers have belief, not knowledge, about the 
many Fs (479el-5). 
Now if Plato were still concerned with the predicative reading of 'is', as in 
(3), one might expect him next to say: 
(4') Belief is set over the many Fs, which are F and not-F. 
But instead of (4'), Plato says (4). Premise (4) does not say that the many 
Fs are and are not; it says that the sightlovers' beliefs (nomima) about the 
many Fs are and are not.1 4 If we are now dealing with beliefs, however, then 
we are back at the veridical reading of 'is'. Plato is claiming that the 
sightlovers' beliefs about the many Fs are and are not true - that is, some of 
them are true, some of them are false. The sightlovers have some true, and 
some false, beliefs about beauty; and this is so precisely because they rely on 
the many Fs, on the many sensible properties. Why should this be so? 
Knowledge, Plato has told us, is truth-entailing; it also requires an 
account (Meno 98a, Phaedo 76b, Republic 53le, 534b). The sightlovers 
define beauty, at least in this painting, as, for instance, 'bright colour'. But 
no such definition can be correct; for some brightly coloured things are ugly. 
not beautiful. The sightlovers cannot then know what beauty is, since their 
account of what beauty is - that it is bright colour - is false. Since their 
account is false, they lack any knowledge of beauty at all; for Plato also 
13 The One over Many assumption, however, might well be thought to violate DR. 
14 Nomimon is a general word for anything one can nomizeln; it also conveys a 
suggestion of generality, and of custom or convention. It can be complemented 
with is-p or with is-v. In the former case It generally means something like 
'customary rules or laws or conventions'·, in the latter case it means something 
like 'customary beliefs'. That the veridical reading is intended here receives 
additional support from 508d8. where Plato makes a parallel point, using doxa 
(which in context clearly means 'belief) rather than nomimon. 
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believes that one can know something about χ only if one knows what χ is. ' ' 
Although the sightlovers thus lack any knowledge about beauty, they 
have belief, not ignorance, about it. For although beauty should not be 
defined in terms of bright colour, many brightly coloured things are beauti­
ful; and so, guided by their false definition, they will be led to some true beliefs 
about beauty, such as that this brightly coloured painting is beautiful. These 
true beliefs cannot constitute knowledge, since they are not adequately 
explained in terms of a correct aitias logismos: but the fact that the sightlovers 
have them shows that they are not ignorant about beauty, even if they do 
not know anything about beauty. 
The sightlovers thus have some true beliefs (about what things are 
beautiful) and some false beliefs (at least about what beauty is). Each of their 
beliefs is determinately true or false; Plato is not using 'belief in a special 
technical sense for 'approximately correct'. Nor is he claiming that everyone 
who has belief, as opposed to knowledge, has some true and some false 
beliefs. As it happens, the sightlover has some true, and some false, beliefs; 
but other believers could have all false, or all .true, beliefs. 
There is, then, a well-argued connecting link between is-v and is-p. The 
claim is that restricted to the many Fs (is-p), which are F and not-F, one can 
at best achieve belief (is-v); for accounts phrased in terms of the many Fs (is-
p), i.e. in terms of sensibles, will inevitably be false (is-v), thereby depriving 
one of any knowledge of the matter to hand. 
If the sightlovers lack knowledge, then either there is no knowledge, or 
knowledgeable accounts must be phrased in terms of non-sensible proper­
ties that are not both F and not-F. Plato rejects the first option and so 
completes the argument as follows (479e7-480a5): 
(6) Knowledge is possible. 
(7) There must, then, be non-sensible objects of knowledge. 
(8) Therefore, there are Forms. 
(9) Those who know Forms have knowledge; those who are restricted 
to the many Fs at best have belief. 
( 10) Therefore knowledge is set over (epi) Forms, and belief is set over the 
many Fs (480a 1). 
Conclusion (6) might seem to violate DR; the sightlovers might protest 
that if they lack knowledge, so does everyone else. The inference to (7) seems 
to depend on the unstated assumption that knowledge requires the exist­
ence of certain sorts of objects.1* 
15 This is Plato's Priority of Knowledge of a Definition claim (see. e.g.. Meno 71b); 
like the One over Many assumption, it seems controversial. 
16 This is not to play into the hands of the existential interpretation of the 
argument discussed at the outset. First, no occurrence of 'Is' needs to be read as 
'exists'; an existential claim is only tacit in the argument. (Though the use of is-
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Is the inference to (8) warranted? That depends on how much we read 
into the word 'Forms'. If (as I believe) the Form of F is the non-sensible 
property of F. which is F and not also not-F, in that it explains the Fness of all 
and only the F things there are, then (8) is validly inferred. If we take Plato, 
in (8), to be arguing for Forms In some other sense, or for further features of 
Forms than their non-sensible, unitary and explanatory nature, then the 
inference to (8) might be unwarranted. But there is no need to assume any 
other sense, or any further features of Forms, in order to understand any part 
of the argument. If we do not. then (8) is validly inferred. 
Conclusion (9) simply summarises conclusions that have already been 
validly argued for: (10), however, might seem worrying. For here Plato says 
that knowledge is set over - not. as we might expect, true propositions, but -
Forms, certain sorts of objects: and that belief is set over - not, as we might 
expect, true and false propositions, but - the many Fs. Does not this suggest 
either that, at this last stage of the argument, Plato falls into an objects 
analysis and embraces TW: or that he intended an objects analysis all along 
(in which case, earlier stages of the argument are invalid, and he begins by 
violating DR)? 
We need not endorse either option. Plato has explained carefully and in 
detail what connection he intends between knowledge, truth and Forms, on 
the one hand; and belief, truth and falsity, and sensibles, on the other. At the 
close of the argument, he offers us an elliptical way of expressing a more 
complex claim. To say that knowledge is set over Forms is shorthand for the 
claim that all knowledge requires knowledge of Forms; to say that belief is set 
over the many Fs is shorthand for the claim that if one is restricted to 
sensibles, the most one can achieve is belief. 
I have provided an account of Plato's argument on which at least its 
opening premises satisfy DR; and on which it is valid and Involves no 
equivocation on 'is'. Though it explicitly uses both is-v and is-p, and tacitly 
relies on an existential claim at one stage as well, there are systematic, 
explanatory connections between the different uses, and no crude slides or 
equivocations. 
Nor does the argument commit Plato to TW. He argues only that, to know 
anything at all, one must know Forms; for knowledge requires an account, 
e is tacit rather than explicit, Aristotle highlights it in his accounts of the theory 
of Forms: cf. the flux arguments recorded In Metaphysics A6. M4 and M9: and 
the second of the Arguments from the Sciences In the Peri IdeOn (Alexander of 
Aphrodisias. Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (in Met.) 79.8-11).) Second, 
Plato Is not now claiming that knowledge is restricted to what exists - which is 
what (1) would claim If It were interpreted existenüally - but only that 
knowledge requires the existence of certain sorts of objects. This reflects a realist 
bias about knowledge, but not one that tells In favour of TW. 
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and it is only by reference to Forms that adequate accounts are forthcoming. 
This leaves open the possibility that once one has these accounts, one can 
apply them to sensibles in such a way as to know them too. Plato does not -
here - explicitly say that knowledge of sensibles is possible. But his argument 
leaves that possibility open; so too, we shall see, does his account in books vi 
and vu. 
Republic vi-vn 
Republic ν distinguishes between knowledge and belief as such; 
Republic vi-vn distinguishes between two sorts of knowledge and two sorts 
of belief. Republic ν tells us that knowledge requires knowledge of Forms; 
Republic vi-vn adds that the best sort of knowledge requires knowledge of 
the Form of the good. Republic ν considers knowledge and belief statically; it 
tells us how they differ, but says nothing about how to improve one's 
epistemological condition. In the Cave allegory in Republic vu, Plato consid­
ers knowledge and belief dynamically; he explains how to move from a lower 
to a higher cognitive condition. 
Much of the epistemology of vi-vn is presented in the three famous images 
of the Sun, Line and Cave. Plato apologises for this fact; he resorts to 
imagery, he tells us, because he lacks any knowledge about the Form of the 
good ( 506c), whose epistemological and metaphysical role he now wishes to 
explain. When one has the best sort of knowledge, he later claims, one can 
dispense with images and speak more directly and literally ( 510b). Though 
many people are not unnaturally moved by Plato's haunting and beautiful 
images, it is important to bear in mind that he himself insists that he offers 
them only because he lacks knowledge; the best sorts of explanations and 
arguments, in his view, should be couched in more straightforward terms. 
The Sun 
Plato begins by repeating book v's distinction between the many Fs, 
which are perceivable, and the Form of F, which is grasped by thought 
(507a7-blO). He then likens the Form of the good to the sun; as the sun is in 
the visible world, so is the Form of the good in the world of thought (en tö(i) 
noêtô(i) topö(i); ta nooumena, 508bl2-c2). The sun is the cause (aitia)17 of 
vision and of the visibility of visible objects: when one looks at visible objects 
in the light of the sun, one sees them; when one looks at them in the dark 
17 Aitia is variously translated as 'cause', "reason' and 'explanation'. 'Cause' Is 
sometimes thought to be a misleading translation, on the ground that causes 
are entities productive of change, whereas altiai are not so restricted. For some 
discussion of the connection between aillai and contemporary accounts of 
causation, see my [117]; also Vlastos [128] and Annas [259]. 
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(unilluminated by the sun), one cannot see them, at least not well (507c-
508d). Similarly, the Form of the good is the cause of knowledge and of the 
knowability of knowable objects (nooumena).1' When one thinks about a 
knowable object illuminated by the Form of the good, one knows it best; 
when one thinks about sensibles unilluminated by the Form of the good, one 
at best has belief about them. The Form of the good is also the cause of the 
being of knowable objects. ' * just as the sun causes objects to come into being 
and to grow. 
The Sun presents an image along with its application.20 The image 
contrasts two ways of looking at visible objects: 
(si ) Sight looks at visible objects in the dark, unilluminated by the sun. 
(s2) Sight looks at visible objects illuminated by the sun. 
(si) illustrates (S3), and (s2) illustrates (S4): 
(S 3 ) The soul is aware only of sensibles unilluminated by the Form of the 
good (or by other Forms), and so has belief. 
(S4) The soul considers knowable objects illuminated by the Form of the 
good, and so has (the best sort of) knowledge. 
The image (si and s2) contrasts two ways of looking at some one sort of 
entity - visible objects. The application (s3 and s4) contrasts two cognitive 
conditions, knowledge and belief. They are described in terms familiar from 
Republic v: restricted to sensibles, one can at best achieve belief; in order to 
know, one must know Forms (and, for the best sort of knowledge, one must 
know the Form of the good). As in Republic v, Plato does not explicitly 
mention two further possibilities: (a) knowledge of sensibles; and (b) belief 
18 It is striking that throughout this passage. Plato uses nooumena, rather than 
'Forms'. Section 507b9-10 might seem to suggest that nooumena refers just to 
Forms. But it is tempting to believe that he deliberately uses nooumena in order 
to suggest, or at least to leave open the possibility, that more than Forms can be 
known. This suggestion is fortified by the fact that the image part of the Sun 
(si + s 2 : see below) contrasts two ways of looking at some one sort of entity 
(visible objects) - suggesting that one can have different cognitive attitudes 
towards a single entity. Perhaps the application part of the Sun (s3 + s4), then. 
also means to contrast (among other things) two ways of considering sensibles, 
with knowledge or with mere belief. Even if nooumena refers only to Forms, TW 
still does not follow. The point would be that one needs to know the Form of 
the good to have (the best sort of) knowledge about Forms. This point does not 
imply that one can have (the best sort of) knowledge only about Forms. 
19 509b7-8 to einai te M Un ousian. I take kai to be epexegetlc. and both to einai 
and tin ousian to refer to the being, the essence, of knowable objects. 
20 I follow Irwin [101], 334, n. 43, in using initial small letters (e.g. 'si', 'cl ') for 
states which illustrate other states, and Initial capital letters (e.g. 'S3', 'LI') for 
the states illustrated; and in using 'Sun' etc. for the name of the image, and 
'sun' etc. for the entitles mentioned in the images. My account of the Sun, Line 
and Cave is indebted to his in more substantial ways as well: see his ch. 7, 
sections 13-14. 
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about Forms. Neither, however, does he preclude (a) and (b). More strongly, 
he seems to believe they are possible. For as we have seen, he introduces the 
Sun image by claiming to have only belief about, and no knowledge of, the 
Form of the good (506c); and he says that the philosopher who returns to the 
cave knows sensibles (520c).21 
Although the Sun distinguishes between the same two conditions as 
Republic v, it adds to Republic ν the claim that the best sort of knowledge 
requires knowledge of the Form of the good (505a, 508a5).22 
Plato seems to believe this new claim because he seems to believe that the 
Form of the good is both a formal and final cause of every knowable object. 
That is, it is part of the essence of every knowable object, and in some sense 
what knowable objects are for. Since knowledge of a thing requires knowing 
its causes, full knowledge of anything requires knowing the Form of the 
good. 
It is easy to see why Plato should believe that the Form of the good is the 
formal and final cause of the virtue Forms. A full account of any virtue - of 
justice or temperance, for instance - will explain its point, what is valuable 
or choiceworthy about it; and that is to explain its contribution to, its 
relation to, the Form of the good. 
But Plato also believes that the Form of the good is the formal and final 
cause of all knowable objects, not just of the virtue Forms. We can best 
understand why if we turn for the moment to Plato's puzzling claim that the 
Form of the good is in some way greater or more important than other 
knowable objects (504c9-e3, 509b6-10), even though, unlike other 
Forms, it is not an ousia, a being (509b9-10). Usually, to call something an 
ousia is to accord it special importance. One might then expect Plato to claim 
that the Form of the good is the most important ousia of all; instead he claims 
that it is not an ousia at all. 
The best explanation of this puzzling claim is that the Form of the good is 
not a distinct Form, but the teleological structure of things; individual Forms 
are its parts, and particular sensible objects instantiate it.21 Just as Aristotle 
insists that the form of a house, for example, is not another element 
21 Moreover, (a) may be tacitly included in (s4). if I am right to suggest that 
nooumena may be used more broadly than for Forms; see n. 18. 
22 Sometimes Plato seems to suggest instead that all knowledge - not just the best 
sort of knowledge - requires knowledge of the Form of the good: see. e.g., 
507dll-e2; 508e3. On the Interpretation assumed in the text, the Sun fits 
better with the Line: and Plato makes It plain that he takes the Line to be 
elaborating the Sun (509d-510a3). Perhaps the unclarity arises partly because 
Plato has not yet explicitly distinguished between the two sorts of knowledge. 
23 For this view, see especially Joseph [142], In particular ch. 3; Gosling [92], 57-
71; and Irwin [101]. 225. 
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alongside the bricks and mortar, but the organisation of the matter, so Plato 
views the Form of the good as the teleologica! organisation of things. If we so 
view the Form of the good, we can explain why Plato claims both that the 
Form of the good Is more important than other knowable objects, and also 
that it Is not an ousia. 
This view also helps to explain why Plato believes that full knowledge of a 
thing requires knowing its relation to the Form of the good. Consider Forms 
first. To know a Form's relation to the Form of the good is to know its place in 
the teleologica! system of which it is a part. Each Form is good in that it has 
the function of playing a certain role in that system; its goodness consists in 
its contribution to that structure, to the richness and harmonious ordering 
of the structure, and its having that place in the system is part of what it is. 
Plato believes, then, that each Form is essentially a good thing - not morally 
good, but, simply, good - in that it is part of what each Form is that it should 
have a certain place in the teleological structure of the world. 
A similar account explains why knowledge of the Form of the good is also 
necessary for fully knowing sensible objects. In the later Timaeus, Plato 
explains that the sensible world was created by the demiurge (27d ff.). Since 
the demiurge is good, he wanted the world to be as good as possible; hence 
he tried to instantiate the Form of the good (and so the teleological structure 
of Forms generally) as widely as possible. Fully to understand his creations, 
then, we need to refer to the Form of the good which they instantiate.2* 
All of this embodies a crucial point to which we shall recur: Plato is a holist 
about knowledge. Full knowledge of anything requires knowing its place in 
the system of which it is a part, or which it instantiates; we do not know 
things in the best way if we know them only in isolation from one another.25 
The Line and Cave 
Plato Introduces the image of the Divided Line in order to elaborate 
the application part of the Sun Image (S3 and S4). He tells us to divide each of 
the Sun's two conditions - knowledge and belief- into two (509d6).2* thus 
yielding two kinds of belief and two kinds of knowledge. The two sorts of 
24 1 discuss Plato on teleology in somewhat more detail, though still briefly, in 
[117]. 
25 It Is often agreed that Plato endorses a holist conception of knowledge in 
various later dialogues; but some believe that that represents a change of view 
from an earlier atomism. See. e.g., Owen [122], ch. 5. On the account I 
propose. Plato is a holist in the Republic no less than in later dialogues. See my 
[184]. 
26 Plato may tell us to divide the line into two unequal parts: but the text is 
uncertain. If the Inequality claim Is made, the two likeliest explanations seem to 
be that (a) the belief part is bigger, because more people have belief: or (b) the 
knowledge part is bigger, because knowledge is more valuable. 
Knowledge and belief in Republic v-vu 99 
belief- corresponding to the two lower stages of the line (LI and L2) are 
eikasia (imagination) and pistis (confidence). The two sorts of knowledge -
corresponding to the higher stages of the line (L3 and L4) - are dianoia 
(thought) and nous (knowledge or understanding).27 
Plato initially explains each stage of the line by means of illustrative 
examples. LI is explained in terms of images of physical objects, L2 in terms 
of physical objects. At L3, one uses hypotheses, and the sensible objects 
imaged in Ll are in their turn used as images of Forms; mathematical 
reasoning is offered as a characteristic example. At L4, one uses dialectic 
(511b, 533c) in order to 'remove' or 'destroy' ( 53 3c8) the hypotheses of L3 -
not by proving them false, but by explaining them in terms of an 
unhypothetical first principle so that they cease to be mere hypotheses. 
Although Plato does not say so explicitly, this first principle is plainly the 
Form of the good (or a definition of, and perhaps further propositions about, 
it).2" At L4 one also reasons directly about Forms without, as in L3, relying 
on sensible images of them. 
Whereas the Line corresponds to the application part of the Sun, the Cave 
corresponds to its image part (si and s2), dividing each of its two parts into 
two (cl-4). It is an allegory, designed primarily tó explain ways of moral 
reasoning ( 514a). Plato begins with a haunting description of prisoners who 
have been bound since birth so that all they have ever seen are shadows on a 
cave wall - shadows of artificial objects illuminated by a fire internal to the 
cave (cl). Strange though the image is, Plato insists that the prisoners are 
'like us' (515a5). Plato then imagines one of these prisoners being re-
leased,29 so that he can see not only the shadows but also the artificial 
objects that cast the shadows. When asked to say what each of the artificial 
objects is, he is at first confused, and thinks the shadows are 'more real' than 
27 Plato's terminology is not fixed. At 510a9, L3 + L4 are collectively called to 
gnôston; at 511a3, b3 they are collectively called to noiton (cf. 533e8-534a). 
When to noëum is used for L3 + L4 collectively, episteme is sometimes used for L4 
(cf. 5 3 3e8 ). Nothing should be made of these terminological variations; Plato 
tells us (533d7-e2) not to dispute about the use of words. 
28 Like Aristotle. Plato speaks of both propositional and non-propositional entities 
as being principles; I shall follow their lead. This double usage involves no 
confusion. One explains, or justifies one's belief in, a proposition by appealing to 
other propositions: but these propositions refer to, are about, various sorts of 
entities, which are explanatory factors one can know. 
29 I assume Plato uses the singular in order to suggest that very few people will 
ever undergo the transformation he describes (although he seems to believe that 
everyone could in principle undergo it). I hope it is not too obvious to be worth 
saying that Plato's picture of the release of the prisoner is an early illustration 
of the biblical saying 'the truth will set you free' - except that Plato believes 
that even the prisoners (us) can have by and large true beliefs; what the Cave 
really illustrates is rather the thesis that 'knowledge will set you free'. 
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the objects. Eventually, though, he is able to discriminate systematically 
between the shadows and the objects, and to see that the latter are 'more 
real' (c2). He learns to distinguish between the appearance or image of an 
object and the object, between appearance and reality. 
Next the prisoner is led out of the cave. At first he sees only shadows of 
natural objects, then the natural objects themselves (c3), and finally the sun 
(c4). He learns to distinguish between appearance and reality outside the 
cave, just as he previously learned to distinguish between them inside the 
cave. 
Each of Plato's three images is distinctively different from the others. The 
Sun describes both image and application; the Line explains the application 
further, while the Cave explains the image further. The Line is illustrated 
with literal examples of its cognitive conditions; the Cave is an allegory 
primarily about ways of moral reasoning. The Sun and Line (like Republic v) 
describe conditions statically; the Cave explains them dynamically. Each 
image offers details not to be found in the others; if we interpret them in the 
light of one another, we can achieve a better grasp of their underlying 
thought than if we consider each on its own.30· 
Plato, then*distinguishes between two sorts of belief- imagination (LI) 
and confidence (L2) - and between two sorts of knowledge - thought (L3) 
and understanding (L4). One familiar way of explaining the differences 
between these conditions relies on an objects analysis: each condition is 
individuated by reference to its unique sort of object. Just as some argue that 
in Republic ν there is belief only about sensibles and knowledge only of 
Forms, so some argue that in Republic vi-vn each cognitive condition has its 
own unique objects. On this view, one is in a belief state (LI or L2), for 
instance, if and only if one is confronted with a certain sort of sensible object 
(images are the usual candidates for LI, and ordinary physical objects for 
L2). As in Republic v, an objects analysis goes naturally with TW.*1 
Just as I rejected an objects analysis of Republic v, so I shall reject one of 
Republic vi-vn, defending again a contents analysis. On the contents analysis, 
L1-L4 are individuated, not by their unique objects (no state has unique 
30 Plato plainly means there to be some correspondence between the three Images; 
at 517b, having completed his initial account of the Cave, he tells us to apply 
that account 'as a whole to all that has been said'. I.e. to the Sun and Line. He 
supplies a brief account of how to do this; but different commentators carry out 
his directions In different ways, and not everyone would agree with the 
connections I have claimed obtain. Nor would everyone agree with the account 
I have provided of the Intrinsic nature of each image. 
31 At least, most objects analyses preclude knowledge of sensibles. However, some 
allow knowledge of more than Forms. For It is sometimes thought that L3 is 
correlated with special mathematical entities that are not Forms but which one 
can know. See n. 35. 
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objects), but by their distinctive sorts of reasoning (by their cognitive 
content). What state one is in is determined by the sort of reasoning one 
engages in, whatever sort of object it is about. To be sure, as in Republic v, one 
needs to know Forms to know anything at all. Hence in a way, objects are 
relevant to determining cognitive level; but as we shall see, they are not 
relevant in a way congenial to TW. 
LI. Imagination 
Plato's initial characterisation of LI is quite brief. He says only that 
'one section of the visible world [is] images. By images I mean, first, shadows, 
and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright 
texture, and everything ofthat kind' (509el-510a3). Similarly, at cl the 
prisoners are bound, and have always been so, so that all that they have ever 
seen are shadows of artificial objects. 
Plato might seem to be suggesting that one is at LI if and only if one is 
confronted with an image of a sensible object - just as the objects analysis 
Would have it. But if so, various difficulties arise. First, most of us don't spend 
much time looking at images and reflections of physical objects;52 nor will 
most people in the ideal city do so. Yet Plato says that most of us are at LI 
(515a5); and that most people in the ideal city would be too (517d4-e2, 
520cl-dl). 
Second, contrary to the objects interpretation, looking at images doesn't 
seem to be either necessary or sufficient for being at LI. It's not necessary 
because the prisoner who is released in the cave and then looks at the 
artificial objects (not just at their images) is at first confused; he is still at LI, 
even though he is confronted with an object, not just with its image. It's not 
sufficient because, as we noted before, Plato says that the philosopher who 
returns to the cave will know the images there (520c); he does not lapse back 
into LI when he looks at images. 
We can avoid these difficulties if we turn to the contents analysis - and 
also understand the nature of and interconnections between Plato's three 
images in the way I have suggested. 
The prisoners are at LI about physical objects not because they see, are 
confronted only with, images of physical objects, but because they cannot 
systematically discriminate between images and the objects they are of. 
32 Contrast White [141], 185f.. who argues, on the basis of bk x, that most of us 
do, in Plato's view, spend a great deal of time looking at images of sensible 
objects, In that we focus only on aspects or appearances of objects, without, 
e.g.. correcting for the effects of perspective. It Is also sometimes suggested that 
we are restricted to appearances of objects In that we are restricted to their 
surface features (e.g. their colour and macroscopic size) and do not know their 
Inner structure (e.g. their atomic constitution). 
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Even if they were confronted with a physical object,'they would remain at 
LI, so long as they could not systematically discriminate between images 
and their objects, and could not tell that the objects are 'more real" than the 
images, in that they cause the Images. They are at LI, not because of the 
objects they are confronted with, but because of the ways In which they 
reason about them. Similarly, the philosopher who returns to the cave does 
not lapse back into LI about images. For he, unlike the prisoners, can 
systematically discriminate between objects and their images; he knows 
that the images are mere images, caused and explained by the physical 
objects. One is at LI about physical objects, then, not just in case one is 
confronted only with images of physical objects, but just in case one cannot 
systematically discriminate between physical objects and Images of them. 
Moreover, one can be at LI in other areas. When Plato says that most of us 
are like the prisoners (are at LI), he does not mean that most of us literally 
see only images of physical objects. He means that our moral beliefs are 
relevantly like the prisoners' beliefs about physical objects; we are at LI in 
our moral beliefs (not in our physical object beliefs), just as they are in LI 
about their physical object beliefs. Thus, for instance, he talks about people 
who 'fight one another for shadows and wrangle for office as if it were a great 
good' ( 5 20c7-d 1 ) - about people, that is, who take seeming goods to be real 
goods, and lesser goods to be greater goods than they are. Or, again, at 
517de, Plato speaks about contending 'about the shadows of justice' -
about, that is, ordinary, unreflective beliefs about justice (cf. 493a6-c8; 
515b4-c2). We uncritically accept what seems just or good as being really 
just or good." 
To be sure, the Line (unlike the Cave) is not an allegory. It describes literal 
examples of cognitive conditions - but they are only illustrative, not exhaus-
tive, examples. The Line illustrates LI reasoning about physical objects; but 
one can be at LI in other areas, for example, about morality. Plato does not 
believe we are at LI about physical objects (so he illustrates LI with an 
example that is not characteristic of us); but we are at LI in our moral 
reasoning. 
Objects are relevant to the line in a way, then: if one cannot make certain 
sorts of distinctions between kinds of objects, the most one can achieve is a 
certain level of understanding about those sorts of objects. This, however, 
plainly allows one to have different cognitive attitudes to the same sorts of 
objects. LI. then, when properly understood, does not suggest an objects 
analysis or TW. 
33 Many of our moral beliefs are not only unreflective, but also false. What is 
crucial about LI, however. Is not that one's beliefs are false, but that they are 
accepted uncritically. Even In Plato's ideally Just city, most people will be at LI. 
even though their beliefs are by and large true (517d4-e2, 520cl-dl) . 
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L2. Confidence 
The prisoners advance to L2 when they are released from their 
bonds and gradually learn to distinguish between the images and the objects 
they are of. This represents the first application of elenchus or dialectic. At 
first the prisoners believe they know that the images exhaust the whole of 
reality. Then, when they are exposed to the objects the shadows are of, and 
are asked to say what those objects are, they become confused and frus-
trated; they are at a loss. In just the same way, interlocutors in the Socratic 
dialogues at first believe they know the answers to Socrates' 'What is Fl? ' 
questions; when cross-examined, they too are quickly at a loss. Most of the 
Socratic dialogues end at this aporetic stage - and so it is sometimes 
concluded that the elenchus is purely negative and destructive (or at best 
plays the modest positive role of getting people to recognise their own 
ignorance). Here, however, the elenchus is carried further - and so Plato 
shows how the Socratic elenchus can enable one to move beyond aporia to 
better-based beliefs (and, in L3 arid L4, to knowledge). For the released 
prisoner gradually learns to discriminate between images and their objects; 
his beliefs become more reliable. Similarly, in the Meno, the elenchus with 
Meno's slave advances beyond aporia, until the slave improves his beliefs. 
Like the prisoner, he moves from LI to L2, from eikasia to pistis - though in 
his case, of course, about a mathematical, not about a moral, belief: he (like 
most of us, in Plato's view) remains at LI about morality. Because he cannot 
give a satisfactory account, an aitias logismos of the sort necessary for 
knowledge (98a), however, he remains at a belief state, though at a better 
one than he was in before.14 Perhaps the Socrates of the Socratic dialogues 
would place himself at L2 about morality. He disclaims knowledge about 
morality, but clearly believes he is in some way better off in his moral 
reasoning than his interlocutors are; the difference between LI and L2 
allows us to see how this could be so. His ability to make certain sorts of 
systematically correct discriminations puts him in a better epistemic posi-
tion than his interlocutors, even though he (believes he) lacks knowledge. 
Just as LI does not support an objects analysis, neither does L2. Plato does 
not mean that one is at L2 if and only if one is confronted with a physical 
object. He rather means that one is at L2 about physical objects if one can 
systematically discriminate between physical objects and images of them, 
34 Though Plato adds {Meno 85c) that if the slave continues practising the 
elenchus. he will eventually reach knowledge. This claim is not further 
explained or defended in the Meno; but it is illustrated in the Cave, in showing 
how elenchus. dialectic, enables us to move not only from LI to L2. but also 
from L2 to L3 and L4. 
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but cannot explain their difference. This, however, allows one to be at L2 
about physical objects even if one is not confronted with a physical object. 
Further, one can be at L2 in other areas - so long as one's reasoning is 
relevantly like the prisoner's reasoning about physical objects when he has 
reached L2. 
L3. Thought 
One moves from L2 to L3 - from a kind of belief to a kind of 
knowledge - when one emerges from the cave, from a preoccupation with 
sensibles, and turns one's attention to non-sensibles, that is, to Forms. As in 
Republic v. here too one needs to be suitably aware of Forms in order to have 
any knowledge at all (although - again as in Republic ν - it does not follow 
that knowledge is restricted to knowledge of Forms). 
Plato initially distinguishes L3 from L4 as follows: 
in one section [L3], the soul is compelled to enquire (a) by using as images 
the things imitated before [at L2], and (b) from hypotheses, proceeding not 
to a first principle but to a conclusion; in the other [L4], it (b) advances from 
a hypothesis tó an unhypothetical first principle, (a) without the images 
used by the other section, by means of Forms themselves, progressing 
methodically through them. (510b 4-9: cf. 511a3-c2) 
When Glaucon professes not to understand this very abstract account, 
Socrates provides a mathematical illustration of L3: 
students of geometry, calculation, and such studies hypothesise the odd 
and the even arid shapes and three kinds of angles and other things akin to 
these in each branch of study, regarding them as known; they make their 
hypotheses, and do not think it worth while to give any further (eti) 
account of them to themselves or to others, thinking they are obvious to 
everyone. Beginning from these, and going through the remaining steps. 
they reach a conclusion agreeing (homologoumenos) [with the premises] on 
the topic they set out to examine. (510c2-d3) 
He adds: 
They also use the visible forms, and make their arguments (logoi) about 
them, although they are not thinking (dianooumenol) of them, but of those 
things they are like, making their arguments for the sake of the square itself 
and the diagonal itself. (510d5-8) 
Plato cites two key differences between L3 and L4: (a) at L3. one uses 
sensibles as images of Forms, although one is thinking of Forms, not of 
sensibles; at L4, one thinks of Forms directly, not through images of them; 
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(b) at L3, one proceeds from a hypothesis to various conclusions; at L4, one 
proceeds from a hypothesis to an unhypothetical first principle ( 51 Ob) - that 
is, to (a definition of, and perhaps also further propositions about) the Form 
of the good. 
L3 poses a threat for the objects analysis. For Plato makes it plain that the 
square itself, etc. can be known in both an L3 and an L4 type way (51 Id); 
contrary to the objects analysis, then, the same objects appear at two distinct 
stages of the l i n e , " Moreover, L3 uses sensibles as images of Forms; but 
sensibles are also in some way correlated with L2. So just as mathematical 
entities appear at both L3 and L4, so sensibles appear at both L2 and Li.3* 
Although Plato provides a geometrical illustration of L3, L3 is not re-
stricted to geometry or even to mathematical disciplines more generally; any 
reasoning that satisfies the more general features (a) and (b) belongs at L3. 
Indeed, it seems reasonable to suggest that al though Socrates (in the 
Socratic dialogues and Meno) places himself at L2 in his moral reasoning, 
Plato in the Republic places himself at L 3 . " 
The Republic is peppered with images used self-consciously to illustrate 
something about Forms: the Sun, Line and Cave are cases in point. Similarly, 
Plato partially explains the nature of justice in the soul through the analo-
gies of health and of justice in the city; he uses the analogy of the ship to 
illustrate the na ture of democracy, and so on. So the Republic's moral 
reasoning satisfies (a). 
It also satisfies (b). Plato claims that the account of the virtues in book iv is 
a mere outline that requires a longer way (435d, 504c9-e2) . That longer 
way involves relating the virtues to the Form of the good (a task not 
undertaken in book iv); and (a definition of) the Form of the good is the 
unhypothetical principle one advances to when one moves from L3 to L4. 
Similarly, Plato offered accounts of the virtues, and justified them in terms of 
3 5 There is dispute about whether 'the square itself, etc. (510d) are Forms; I 
assume they are, but others take them to be mathematical entitles that are 
distinct from Forms. For some discussion of this matter, see Annas [127]; 
Wedberg (124). esp. appendix D. The difficulty I pose for the objects analysis 
arises whether or not they are Forms: for the crucial point is that, whatever 
they are, they can be known in both an L3 and an L4 type way. 
36 Moreover, If Plato, in saying that L3 uses sensibles, means to suggest that 
sensibles can be objects of L3 as well as of L2 eplstemlc attitudes, then, contrary 
to TW, Plato explicitly allows one to have at least L3 type knowledge of 
sensibles. Even if, in saying that L3 uses sensibles, Plato does not mean to say 
thereby that sensibles can be known In at least an L3 type way, we shall see 
that he nonetheless leaves open the possibility that one can have L3 (and L4) 
type knowledge of sensibles. 
37 For this suggestion, see also Gallop [159]. [160] and Irwin [101], 222-3. 
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their explanatory power: but the accounts were partial, and not justified in 
terms of anything more fundamental.1· 
Plato is often said to favour a mathematical model of knowledge. He does, 
to be sure, count mathematics as a type of knowledge; and mathematical 
studies play an extremely Important role in the philosophers' education. But 
he places mathematics at L3 - it Is the lower form of knowledge. Moreover, it 
is just one example of L3 type reasoning - Plato's moral reasoning in the 
Republic is another example of it. Further, the higher type of knowledge - L4 
- is not mathematical but dialectical. 
Nor does Plato praise mathematics for the reasons one might expect. To be 
sure, he emphasises its value in getting us to turn from 'becoming to truth 
and being' (52 5c), that is, in getting us to acknowledge Forms. But he adds 
in the same breath, as though it is of equal importance, that mathematics is 
also of value in the practical matter of waging war (525bc; cf. 522e, 526d). 
Nor does he praise mathematics for using necessary truths or for conferring 
some special sort of certainty. On the contrary, he believes that even if 
mathematical truths are necessary, they cannot be fulty known until they, 
like all other truths, are suitably related to the Form of the good. Mathemat­
ics is not invoked as a paradigm of a discipline consisting of self-evident 
truths standing in need of no further justification or explanation.1' More­
over. although mathematical reasoning may be deductive. L3 is not re­
stricted to deductive reasoning: it includes other ways of explaining the less 
general in terms of the more general. Platonic moral argument, for instance, 
also belongs at L3, although it is not deductive in character. 
It can appear puzzling that Plato counts L3 even as an inferior type of 
knowledge. To see why, I first need to say a bit more about what he thinks 
knowledge in general involves. 
We have seen that Plato believes that in addition to true belief, knowledge 
requires an account or logos (Meno 98a; Phaedo 76d; Republic 531e, 534b). 
Call this KL. 
It is tempting to infer that Plato is offering a version of the justified true 
belief account of knowledge; and many have succumbed to the tempta-
38 Cf. the account of the hypothetical method In Phaedo 100 ff. (which Is plainly 
not restricted to mathematical reasoning), which the account of L3 clearly 
recalls. Plato's account of L3 also recalls the Meno. There too Plato uses a 
geometrical example to illustrate a point about our capacity for reaching moral 
knowledge: he again uses diagrams, but in order to make a point about non-
senslbles (diagonals): he insists that in a dialectical, as opposed to eristic, 
context, one should use claims the interlocutor agrees he knows (75d), just as 
here he says that the mathematicians assume that their hypotheses are obvious 
to everyone; and. of course, he again uses the hypothetical method. 
39 For an interesting and provocative discussion of this matter, see Taylor [164], 
202-3. 
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tion.*° Recently, however, some have argued that the temptation ought to 
'be resisted.41 For, it is argued, KL requires, not a justification for believing 
that something is so, but an explanation of why it is so.42 
I agree that the sort of account Plato at least typically has in mind is an 
explanation. Often, for instance, he speaks, not of knowing propositions, but 
of knowing things. To know a thing, he believes, usually involves being able 
to say what it is, in the sense of articulating its nature or essence; doing this 
explains what the entity in question is. Even when Plato speaks instead of 
knowing a proposition, the sort of account he generally has in mind is an 
explanation of why it is so; sometimes this involves proving it, or explaining 
the natures of any entities it mentions. 
But although Platonic accounts are typically explanations, we should not 
infer that he therefore rejects or bypasses a justified true belief account of 
knowledge. His view is rather that justification typically consists in, or at 
least requires, explanation. For Plato, I am typically justified in believing ρ 
only if I can explain why ρ is so; I am typically justified in claiming to know 
some object only if I can explain its nature or essence: 
In addition to KL, Plato also believes that knowledge must be based on 
knowledge (KBK): I know a thing or proposition only if I can provide an 
account of it which I also know. Stating an account of something is not 
sufficient for knowing it; in addition, I must know the account.4 1 
The conjunction of KL and KBK raises the threat of the famous regress of 
justification: to know something, I must, given KL, provide an account of it. 
Given KBK, I must know this account. Given KL, I must then provide an 
account of it which, given KBK, I must also know - and so on, it seems, ad 
infinitum. Plato discusses this regress in some detail in the Theaetetus; but it is 
lurking not far below the surface here as well.44 
Plato also believes, as we know from Republic v, that if one knows 
anything at all, one knows Forms. 
40 See, e.g.. Chisholm [398], 5-7; Armstrong [394], 137: and my [184]. 
41 See especially Burnyeat [228], esp. 134f.; and [180]. We have seen before that 
if Plato accepts TW. that too precludes a justified true belief account of 
knowledge since, on TW, knowledge precludes belief; at the moment, however, I 
am concerned with a different challenge attributing a justified true belief 
account of knowledge to Plato. 
42 This Is also sometimes used as part of an argument for the claim that Plato is 
not so much concerned with knowledge as with understanding. I consider this 
argument briefly below, in discussing L4. 
43 KBK Is most explicitly discussed and defended in the later Theaetetus; but 
Republic 533c (quoted and discussed below) may endorse it as well. 
44 I discuss the regress as it emerges in the Theaetetus in [184], I argue there that 
Plato avoids the infinite regress by allowing justifications to be circular, if the 
circle is sufficiently large and explanatory. As we shall see, this is also the 
resolution I believe Plato favours in the Republic. In this respect as in others, 
Plato's epistemology remains relatively constant, whatever the fate of the theory 
of Forms. 
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Can one satisfy these three conditions for knowledge - KL, KBK and 
knowing Forms - within the confines of L3? And if so, how does Plato 
respond to the regress KL and KBK seem to give rise to? I begin by looking at 
KL and KBK in the abstract; I leave until later the question of whether 
everyone at L3 provides accounts of Forms, 
Plato says that at L3, one offers hypotheses, which are then used in order 
to derive various conclusions. Are the hypotheses or the conclusions known 
at L3? At 510c7, Plato says that mathematicians offer hypotheses without 
giving any further (eti) account of them. Later he says that mathematicians 
can't: 
see [Forms] clearly so long as they leave their hypotheses undisturbed and 
cannot give an account of them. For if one does not know (oide) the starting 
point (archi), and the conclusion and intervening steps are woven together 
from what one does not know (oide), how ever could this sort of agreement 
(homologia) be knowledge (episteme)? (533c!-5) 
Both passages may seem to suggest that KL cannot be satisfied for the 
hypotheses at L3. But if KL is not satisfied for the hypotheses at L3, then the 
hypotheses are not known at L3, since KL is a necessary condition *°Γ 
knowledge. Moreover, if KL is not satisfied, then neither is KBK; for one 
certifies that one knows something by producing an account of it. 
KL might be satisfied in the case of the conclusions. For the hypotheses 
and proofs used to derive the conclusions might reasonably be thought to 
constitute an account of- an explanation of, and so an adequate justifica­
tion for believing - them. But if the hypotheses are not themselves known. 
then KBK seems to be violated in the case of the conclusions; and so, since 
KBK is also a necessary condition for knowledge, the conclusions seem not 
to be known either. 
It is thus initially unclear why Plato counts L3 as a type of knowledge. For 
KL, and so KBK, seem to be violated for the hypotheses; and at least KBK 
seems to be violated for the conclusions. 
I suggest the following resolution of this difficulty. In saying that no 
(further) account of the hypotheses is given at L3. Plato does not mean that 
KL cannot be satisfied for them at L3. He only means, first, that no account 
can be given of them at L3 in terms of something more fundamental, such as 
the Form of the good; and, second, that at L3 they are used in an enquiry, in 
order to derive various results, before their assumption has been justified. 
The mathematician says, for instance, 'Let a triangle be a plane figure 
enclosed by three straight lines', and then goes on to derive various conclu­
sions about triangles, without first giving us any reason to accept his 
account of a triangle. 
None of this, however, precludes the possibility of justifying the hypoth-
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eses in the course of the enquiry. And it is clear how this can be done. For in 
using them in order to reach various results, one displays their explanatory 
power, shows what results one is able to achieve by using them; and 
showing this is one way of providing an account. In just the same way, 
scientists often offer speculative hypotheses, which become confirmed when 
they are shown to explain some variety of phenomena. One can, then, even 
within the confines of L3, satisfy KL for the hypotheses. 
Does one then know the hypotheses? Only if KBK is also satisfied. For KBK 
to be satisfied, however, the conclusions must be known, for the hypotheses 
are justified in terms of the conclusions. But we said before that the 
conclusions might not be known because, although KL seemed satisfied in 
their case, KBK was not, because the hypotheses were not known. We seem 
locked in a vicious circle: we can provide accounts of the hypotheses in terms 
of the conclusions, and of the conclusions in terms of the hypotheses; but we 
do not yet seem to have reached anything that is known. 
But although there is a circle here, it is not a vicious one. The hypotheses 
are justified in terms of the conclusions,.and the conclusions in terms of the 
hypotheses. In providing these mutually supporting accounts, one comes to 
know both hypotheses and conclusions. One does not first know the hypoth­
eses, and then the conclusions; one comes to know both simultaneously, in 
seeing how well the hypotheses explain the conclusions. Instead of a vicious 
circle, there are mutually supporting, interlocking claims. 
I suggest, then, that both KL and KBK can be satisfied for conclusions and 
hypotheses alike, within the confines of L3. One satisfies KL for the hypoth­
eses by appealing to their explanatory power; and one satisfies KL for the 
conclusions by deriving them from the hypotheses. In thus deriving the 
conclusions, and seeing how well the whole resultant system fits together, 
one acquires knowledge of both conclusions and hypotheses, and so satisfies 
KBK for both as well. 
Now I said before that the conjunction of KL and KBK threatens a regress: 
to know p, I must know q; to know q, I must know r, and so on, it seems, ad 
infinitum. There are many different responses to the regress, but two of the 
most popular are foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalism claims 
that the regress halts with basic beliefs that are not themselves justified in 
terms of any further beliefs; they are self-justified, or self-evident. 
Coherentism claims that the regress is finite but has no end; accounts can 
circle back on themselves. I explain ρ in terms of q, and q in terms of r, and so 
on until, eventually, I appeal again to p; but if the circle is sufficiently large 
and explanatory, then it is virtuous, not vicious.45 
45 There are, of course, many different versions of foundationalism and 
coherentism. Not all foundationalists. e.g., require self-evident beliefs, as 
opposed to, e.g.. initial warrant or credibility. Those who view Plato as a 
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Plato has typically been counted a foundationalisL At least for L3, 
however, he seems to be a coherentist. For he counts L3 as a type of 
knowledge, and so believes that KL and KBK are satisfied at L3. But the best 
explanation of how this could be so appeals to circular accounts, in the way I 
have suggested. 
One might argue that the passage cited above from 533c (cf. Cratylus 
436cd) shows that Plato rejects coherentism.46 but it does not. The passage 
does seem to commit Plato to KBK; if one does not know the starting point 
neither does one know the conclusions derived from it. because knowledg. 
must be based on knowledge. That, however, does not show that one cannot 
come to know the starting-point through deriving conclusions from it, and 
then come to know the conclusions by deriving them from the starting-
point. The passage may also suggest that consistency or agreement is 
insufficient for knowledge; but any self-respecting coherentist would agree. 
For. first, the relevant sort of coherence involves more than consistency or 
agreement; in addition, the consistent beliefs must be mutually supporting 
and explanatory, and form a sufficiently large group. And, second, not even 
such coherence is sufficient for knowledge, but only for justification; knowl-
edge also requires truth. 
I have suggested that if Plato is a coherentist about justification, at least 
for L3, then both KL and KBK can be satisfied at L3, for hypotheses and 
conclusions alike. One further problem remains, however. If L3 is a type of 
knowledge, then at L3 one must know Forms. Now Plato (who seems to 
place himself at L3 in his moral reasoning) seems to believe that he has at 
least partial knowledge of some Forms: so at least one person he places at L3 
knows some Forms. But he also places the mathematicians at L3 about 
mathematics; yet it may seem unclear that they know mathematical - or 
any - Forms. At least, it seems unlikely that mathematicians explicitly 
recognise Forms at all; there are no entities in their ontology that they call 
'Forms'. If they do not explicitly admit Forms into their ontology, is it 
appropriate to say that they know Forms? 
This problem too can be resolved. The mathematicians offer hypotheses. 
These hypotheses include accounts, or partial accounts, of, for example, the 
square itself;47 and the square itself etc. are Forms. So the mathematicians 
offer accounts of Forms. To be sure, they do not know that the entities they 
foundatlonalist, however, typically believe that his version invokes self-evident 
beliefs. For one good recent defence of coherentism about justification, see 
Bonjour [395], part 2, especially ch. 5 and 7. 
46 See. e.g.. White [106], 113, n. 50. 
47 This is sometimes disputed: but for a good defence of the claim, see Taylor 
[164], 193-203. 
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are defining are Forms. It does not follow, however, that they do not know 
the entities they are defining; it follows only that there are some facts about 
these entities that they do not know. But one can know an object even if one 
does not know everything about it. And Plato makes it plain that mathema-
ticians know some crucial facts about the entities they define. Not only do 
they offer hypotheses, partial definitions of them. But they also know, for 
instance, 'that the unit should never appear to be many parts and not to be 
one' (525e) - the one the mathematician is concerned with is one, and not 
also not one; it does not suffer compresence of opposites. They may also 
know that mathematical entities are non-sensible (for example, 5 l id , 
525de, 526al-7) . Perhaps this shows that mathematicians treat math-
ematical entities as Forms, even though they do not recognise that that is 
what they are doing. 
Nonetheless, if one can know a Form without knowing that what one 
knows is a Form, then the conditions for knowing Forms might seem weaker 
here than they did in Republic v. At least, the philosopher described there 
seems explicitly to countenance Forms in a way mathematicians do not. 
Still, perhaps that is only sufficient, and not also necessary, for knowledge. 
Mathematicians still differ significantly from anyone at LI or L2. For such 
people do not have any de dicto beliefs about Forms (although they may of 
course have some de re beliefs about them); but mathematicians do have 
some de dicto beliefs about Forms, as expressed in their hypotheses, even if 
they lack the de dicto belief that what they are defining is a Form. 
L4. Understanding 
At L4, one reaches an unhypothetical first principle (a definition of, 
and perhaps further propositions about) the Form of the good. When one 
can suitably relate the hypotheses of L3 to the Form of the good, the 
hypotheses are removed or destroyed ( 5 3 3c8) - that is, they cease to be mere 
hypotheses, they lose their hypothetical status and become known in an L4 
type way (51 Id) and not merely, as before, in an L3 type way. Moreover, at 
L4 one no longer uses sensibles but only Forms. 
In saying that at L4 one no longer uses sensibles, Plato does not mean that 
there is no L4 type knowledge of sensibles. He means only that atL4 one no 
longer needs to explain the nature of Forms through images of them; one can 
speak of them directly, as they are in and of themselves. But once one has 
done this, one can apply these accounts to sensibles, in such a way as to have 
L4 type knowledge of them. In just the same way, Aristotle believes that one 
can define various species and genera without reference to particular 
instances of them; but, once one has done this, one can apply the definitions 
to particulars in such a way as to have knowledge of them. 
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L4 raises the following problem. At L4, one explains the hypotheses by 
relating them to something more fundamental (the Form of the good), 
which is itself known. But how is the Form of the good known? It cannot be 
explained in terms of something yet more fundamental - for there is nothing 
more fundamental (and if there were, we could raise the same question 
about how it is known, and then we would be launched on an Infinite 
regress). Are not KBK and KL then violated at this later stage? The same 
difficulty that arose for L3 seems to arise for the Form of the good at L4. 
One answer - popular historically - is to say that both the route to L4, and 
what L4 type knowledge consists in, is some sort of vision or acquaintance. 
One knows the Form of the good, not by explaining it in terms of something 
more fundamental, but by a self-certifying vision, which is also what the 
knowledge consists in.4" The threatened regress thus halts with a self-
certifying vision that confers knowledge. This answer essentially abandons 
KL; for it claims that knowledge does not require an account after all, but 
only a vision. 
However, Plato repeatedly stresses that the route to L4 (as to L2 and L3) is 
dialectic (511b,c, 533a-d) - the Socratic method of cross-examination, of 
critically testing beliefs against general principles and examples.4' More­
over, Plato asks rhetorically, 'do you not call the person who is able to get an 
account of the essence of each thing "dialectician"? And will you not say 
that someone who cannot do this, insofar as he cannot give an account to 
himself and others, to that extent lacks knowledge (nous) about the matter?' 
(534b3-6). 
Dialectic, not acquaintance, is thus the route to L4; and since L4 crucially 
involves the ability to provide an account, neither does it consist in acquaint­
ance alone. KL is thus not abandoned at L4, Even if acquaintance is 
necessary for L4, it is not sufficient; an account is also needed. And so our 
problem remains: what is there in terms of which we can justify our beliefs 
about the Form of the good?'" 
48 An acquaintance view is favoured by, e.g., Comford [161]. See also the 
discussion in Robinson [102], 172-9 for a critical assessment of the 
acquaintance view (or, as he calls it, the 'intuition' theory). 
49 There is one difference in the practice of dialectic at L4 and at earlier stages, 
however: at L4 dialectic is practised kat'ouslan; at earlier stages it is practised 
kata doxan (534c2). By this Plato means that at L4 dialectic is practised on 
accounts of Forms - i.e. on the hypotheses of L3 (although, of course, when one 
begins, these are not fully satisfactory accounts - otherwise one would already 
be at L4); at L2 and L3, on common beliefs that fall short of knowledge and are 
not (except perhaps de re) about Forms. The method Is the same, although what 
it is applied to differs. 
50 Although 1 have argued only that acquaintance is not sufficient for knowledge, 
I do not believe it is necessary either. The chief reasons for introducing 
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An alternative - and I think preferable - solution appeals again to 
coherence: one justifies one's claims about the Form of the good, not in terms 
of anything more fundamental (there is nothing more fundamental), but in 
terms of its explanatory power, in terms of the results it allows one to 
achieve; and one justifies one's acceptance of the hypotheses of L3 by 
explaining them both in terms of their results and in terms of the Form of the 
good. The Form of the good, we have seen, is the teleological structure of the 
world; other Forms are its parts, and sensibles instantiate it. We justify 
claims about other Forms and about sensibles by relating them to this 
general structure; and we justify claims about the Form of the good by 
showing how well it allows us to explain the natures of, and 
interconnections between, other Forms and sensibles. There is again a 
circle; but, again, it is a virtuous, not a vicious, circle. 
But how, it might be asked, could this be so? For didn't we propose a 
moment ago that L3 was an inferior type of knowledge precisely because it 
relied on coherence? If so, how could L4's justifications also be rooted in 
coherence? 
The answer is that it is not coherence as such that makes L3 inferior to L4, 
but the degree and kind of coherence. Both L3 and L4 rely on coherence for 
justification; but their coherentist accounts differ. The justifications at L3 
are piecemeal, restricted to individual branches of knowledge - one justifies 
mathematical beliefs, for example, solely in terms of mathematical claims, 
and so on (mutatis mutandis) for morality and the like. At L4, by contrast, one 
offers more synoptic accounts, integrating every branch of reality into a 
synoptic whole, in terms of the Form of the good (531c6-e5: 537b8-c7) -
that is, in terms of the teleological structure of reality. The mathematician, 
for instance, provides some sort of account of the square itself; the dialecti­
cian provides an account of each thing (5 34b), and relates each thing to the 
Form of the good. The mathematician restricts himself to mathematical 
connections; the dialectician provides 'a comprehensive survey of their 
affinities with one another and with the nature of things' (537c) - his 
accounts are not restricted to individual branches of knowledge, but interre-
acquaintance seem to be (a) that it is needed to halt the regress; and (b) that 
Plato's visual metaphors suggest it. Reason (a), however, is false; coherence is 
another way of halting the regress and, as I go on to explain, I believe it is 
Plato's way of halting the regress at L4 as at L3. As to (b), even if Plato's visual 
metaphors suggest some sort of acquaintance, they do not require it. The 
metaphors can as easily be Interpreted in terms of understanding; when I say 
that I finally see the point of what you have said, I do not mean that I have 
had some special vision that confers knowledge, but that I now understand 
what you have said. For this point, see Gosling [92], esp. ch. 8; and Bumyeat 
[397]; see also my [184]. 
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late them, by means of the Form of the good. He shows the point and 
interconnection of all things, 
L4 thus relies on coherence no less than does L3; but its coherentist 
explanations are fuller and richer, and that Is why L4 counts as a better sort 
of knowledge. Not every sort of coherentist account Is equally good; L4 Is an 
improvement on L3, not because It appeals to something different from 
coherence, but because its coherentist accounts are more explanatory. 
This account also helps to explain how L4 type knowledge of sensibles is 
possible. The teleological structure of the world is stated in general terms, in 
terms of properties and natural laws, without reference to sensibles. How-
ever, once this general structure is articulated, one can have L4 type 
knowledge of sensibles by seeing what properties and laws they instantiate, 
and by seeing how they contribute to the goodness of things. 
Indeed, Plato's coherentism may require that L4 type knowledge of 
sensibles be possible. At least, it seems reasonable to suppose that Plato 
believes that one eventually needs to refer back to sensibles in order to justify 
one's belief that one has correctly articulated the world of Forms - for part of 
one's justification for believing one has correctly articulated the world of 
Forms is that it allows one to explain sensibles so well. If Plato accepts KBK. 
and believes one needs to refer to sensibles to justify one's beliefs about 
Forms, then he must allow knowledge of sensibles. 
On the account I have proposed, one knows more to the extent that one 
can explain more: knowledge requires, not a vision, and not some special 
sort of certainty or infallibility, but sufficiently rich, mutually supporting, 
explanatory accounts. Knowledge, for Plato, does not proceed piecemeal; to 
know, one must master a whole field, by interrelating and explaining its 
diverse elements. 
It is sometimes argued that if this is so, we ought not to say that Plato is 
discussing knowledge at all; rather, he is discussing the distinct phenom-
enon of understanding. For, it is said, understanding, but not knowledge, 
requires explanation and Interrelated accounts; and knowledge, but not 
understanding, requires certainty, and allows one to know propositions 
individually, not only collectively. A more moderate version of this general 
sort of view claims that Plato Is discussing knowledge - but an older concept 
of knowledge, according to which knowledge consists in or requires under-
standing, in contrast to 'knowledge as knowledge is nowadays discussed in 
philosophy.'" 
Now I agreed before that for Plato, knowledge typically requires explana-
tion; but I argued too that this is only to say that for him. justification 
51 Bumyeat [180]. 188. A similar view is defended by Annas. 
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typically requires explanation. Similarly, I agree that, for Plato, knowledge 
does not require any sort of vision or certainty, but does require interrelating 
the elements of a field or discipline or, for L4, interrelating the elements of 
different disciplines in the light of the Form of the good. But, once again, I do 
not think this shows that he is uninterested in knowledge. We can say, if we 
like, that he believes knowledge consists in or requires understanding. But I 
would then want to add that this is not so different from 'knowledge as 
knowledge is nowadays discussed in philosophy'. To be sure, some contem-
porary epistemologists focus on conditions for knowing that a particular 
proposition is true, or believe that knowledge requires certainty, or that 
justification does not consist in or require explanation. But that is hardly 
characteristic of all contemporary epistemology. Indeed, concern with cer-
tainty is rather in disfavour these days; and many contemporary 
epistemologists defend holist conceptions of knowledge, and appeal to 
explanatory connections to explicate the sort of coherence a justified set of 
beliefs must exhibit. Plato does indeed explicate epistëmê'm terms of explana-
tion and interconnectedness, and not in terms of certainty or vision; but we 
should resist the inference that he is therefore not talking about knowledge, 
or that, if he fs, he has an old-fashioned or unusual notion of knowledge. On 
the contrary, in this as in other matters, Plato is surprisingly up to date. 
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